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Abstract 
Prior research finds that the decline in the information content of earnings after restatement 
announcements is short-lived and that the earnings response coefficient (ERC), the proxy for the 
information content of earnings, bounces back after three quarters. We re-examine the 
persistence of the drop in the ERC after restatement announcements using a more comprehensive 
and recent sample of restatements. We find that material restatement firms experience a 
significant decrease in the ERC over a prolonged period – close to three years after restatement 
announcements. In contrast, other restatement firms experience a decline in the ERC only for one 
quarter after restatement announcements. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that among 
material restatement firms, those that are subject to more credibility concerns and those that do 
not take prompt actions to improve reporting credibility are associated with a longer drop in the 
ERC than others. Lastly, we reconcile our findings with prior studies. Our analyses indicate that 
using a potentially more powerful proxy for material restatements and imposing less restrictive 
sampling requirement help increase the power of the tests to detect the long-run drop in the ERC.   
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1. Introduction 
There has been an unprecedented number of accounting restatements in the last decade. 
The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that from January 1997 to June 
2002, 919 firms restated their financial statements because of material accounting errors and/or 
frauds (GAO 2003). Spurred by the ever-growing list of accounting and corporate scandals, the 
U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes and Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. However, Hennes et al. 
(2008) and others find that the number of accounting restatements continues to be high in the 
post-SOX period. To understand the implications of accounting restatements for firms and 
investors, a growing number of studies examine various consequences of restatements, including 
the drop in market value, the increase in the cost of capital, and the impact on key corporate 
decisions (such as compensation, executive turnover, and external financing).1   
Of particular interest to accounting researchers is the change in the information content of 
earnings after restatement announcements. Anderson and Yohn (2002) document a significant 
drop in the information content of earnings, measured by the earnings response coefficient 
(ERC), for the first annual earnings announcement after restatement announcements. Similarly, 
Wu (2002) documents a significant drop in the ERC for the first two quarters after restatement 
announcements. Since one of the concerns expressed by regulators and investors is that 
restatements reduce the credibility of accounting information in the long run, Wilson (2008) 
examines the change in the information content of earnings for a longer period, the six quarters 
after restatement announcements, using a sample of 215 restatements over the period 1997-2002. 
In contrast to what regulators and investors have feared, she finds that the drop in the ERC is 
short-lived: it only lasts for three quarters after restatement announcements. Wilson also finds 
                                                 
1 For examples, see Palmrose et al. (2004), Hribar and Jenkins (2004), Desai et al. (2006), Graham et al. (2008), 
Cheng and Farber (2008), and Chen et al. (2012). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2253689
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that even for more severe restatements, such as those related to revenue recognition and those 
with more negative stock market reactions, and for firms that did not take any action to improve 
investor confidence (e.g., replacing the CEO and the auditor), the decline in the ERC is still 
short-lived – for three quarters after restatement announcements.  
Interestingly, the finding of a short-term drop in the ERC after restatement announcements 
is at odds with the findings of other restatement studies. First, prior research finds that 
restatements have a long-term impact on capital market access. For example, both Graham et al. 
(2008) and Chen et al. (2012) find that the adverse impact of accounting restatements on firms’ 
external financing activities (including the cost, term, and structure of external financing) lasts 
for about three years. Since both the drop in the ERC and the changes in firms’ external 
financing are influenced by investors’ negative perception of accounting quality after restatement 
announcements, it is intriguing that while firms do not appear to regain investors’ full trust in the 
capital markets for a long time, investors’ confidence in the reported earnings numbers appears 
to bounce back to the pre-restatement level in less than one year.  
Second, prior research finds that restatement firms undertake various actions to restore 
investors’ trust and many such actions take time to implement. For example, Farber (2005) finds 
that accounting fraud firms improve corporate governance to enhance financial reporting 
credibility (e.g., by increasing the number of outside directors). He finds that it takes fraud firms 
up to three years to achieve the same quality of corporate governance as non-fraud firms. 
Srinivasan (2005) finds significant director turnovers in both the first and second year after 
restatement announcements. Cheng and Farber (2008) find that the change in restatement firms’ 
compensation structure mainly occurs in the second and third year after restatement 
announcements. It is thus puzzling how restatement firms regain investors’ trust of reported 
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earnings in less than one year when many of the remedies undertaken by restatement firms to 
restore investors’ trust take longer to materialize.  
Motivated by these puzzling findings, in this paper, we re-examine the persistence of the 
drop in the ERC after restatement announcements using a more comprehensive and recent 
sample of restatements. Our full sample includes 1,208 restatements in the GAO report over the 
period 1997-2006. This investigation is important because whether the drop in the information 
content of earnings is short-lived or long-lived has important implications for regulators, firms, 
investors, and researchers. A short-lived drop might send the message that firms do not need to 
worry too much about the adverse impact of restatements on the credibility of accounting 
information. In contrast, a long-lived drop implies that investors are concerned with accounting 
information quality over an extended period and that firms should take actions to restore investor 
trust, or better still, firms should prevent the occurrence of misstatement in the first place in order 
to avoid the long-lasting consequences of reduced reporting credibility.  
Because severe restatements likely lead to a greater loss of credibility among investors and 
hence a longer drop in the ERC after restatement announcements, we separate the full sample of 
restatements into severe restatements and other restatements.2 We use the accounting 
irregularities as classified by Hennes et al. (2008) to proxy for severe restatements.3 Consistent 
with accounting irregularities capturing severe restatements,  recent studies find that accounting 
                                                 
2 Consistent with severe misstatements resulting in long-term damage to investors’ trust, Dechow et al. (1996) 
examine Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) and report that accounting fraud firms 
experience an increase in the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts in the three years following announcements of 
earnings manipulation. They suggest that such a long-lasting increase in investors’ uncertainty results from tarnished 
reporting credibility. 
3 Hennes et al. classify restatements as “accounting irregularities” if restatement announcements or SEC filings use 
words like “irregularity” or “fraud,” if the firm is charged by the SEC or the Department of Justice, or if the firm is 
subject to independent investigations. See Hennes et al. (2008, 1493-1494) for details and Andrew Leone’s website 
for the list of accounting irregularities (http://sbaleone.bus.miami.edu/). While not all accounting irregularities are 
intentional or fraudulent in nature, the investigation or the lawsuit is evidence of the severity of the restatements and 
investors’ suspicion of reported numbers.   
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irregularity and other restatement firms face significantly different consequences. For example, 
Hennes et al. (2008) find that the likelihood of CEO turnover is significantly higher for 
accounting irregularity firms than for other restatement firms. Chen et al. (2012) find that since 
equity financing is more sensitive to information asymmetry problems, firms rely more on debt 
financing than on equity financing after restatements, but this result only applies to accounting 
irregularity firms. Of the 1,208 restatements in our full sample, 343 are classified as accounting 
irregularities, referred to as material restatements hereafter, and 865 as other restatements.4  
We find that the material restatement firms experience a significant decline in the ERC for 
11 quarters after restatement announcements. This is a remarkably longer period compared to the 
3-quarter period reported in prior research, suggesting that the decline in the credibility and 
information content of earnings after restatements is not short-lived. In contrast, other 
restatement firms experience a significant decline in the ERC only in the first quarter after 
restatement announcements. The results are not driven by contemporaneous changes in economic 
conditions; we find that the matching firms do not experience a drop in the ERC over the sample 
period. We find qualitatively similar results when we use alternative data sources of restatements 
(i.e., Audit Analytics), alternative classifications of material restatements (e.g., AAER cases), 
alternative measures of earnings surprises (e.g., seasonal random walk model), or when we 
separately analyze pre- and post-SOX restatements.   
We conduct a series of cross-sectional analyses to provide additional insights into what 
affects the drop in the ERC after restatement announcements. Given that only material 
restatements are associated with a prolonged drop in the ERC, we focus on these restatements in 
our cross-sectional analyses. In the first set of cross-sectional analyses, we examine whether 
                                                 
4 As discussed in detail later, our proxy for severe restatements differs from Wilson’s (2008) and we also use 
different sampling restriction from Wilson. These research design differences contribute to the differences in 
inferences between our study and Wilson.   
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firms that are more susceptible to earnings credibility concerns experience a longer drop in the 
ERC. Prior studies suggest that good news is more sensitive to credibility issues than bad news 
(e.g., Skinner 1994, 1997) and earnings with high accruals are more likely to be questioned by 
investors than those with low accruals (e.g., Gleason et al. 2008). Thus, if the drop in the ERC is 
caused by the loss of financial reporting credibility, we expect to observe a more persistent drop 
in the ERC for good news firms than for bad news firms and for high accrual firms than for low 
accrual firms. The evidence is consistent with the our predictions and provides further support to 
our arguments; any alternative explanation must explain why the effect only shows up among 
material restatement firms and, particularly, those subject to greater credibility issues.  
In the second set of cross-sectional analyses, we examine how the drop in the ERC varies 
with the remedies undertaken by restatement firms. Since material restatement firms have 
aggressive financial reporting practices in the past, those that increase accounting conservatism 
in the post-restatement period are expected to regain investors’ trust faster than others. Indeed, 
we find that the significant drop in the ERC is much shorter for restatement firms that increase 
conservatism than for other restatement firms (6 versus 11 quarters). In addition, given that key 
executives (chief executive officers and chief financial officers), external auditors, and audit 
committee chair are the major players influencing financial reporting quality, we examine the 
impact of CEO/CFO turnover, auditor dismissal, and audit committee chair turnover on the drop 
in the ERC after restatement announcements. We find that material restatement firms with 
turnover of both CEO and CFO in the year of restatement announcement experience a drop in the 
ERC only in the first year after restatement announcements. In contrast, material restatement 
firms without CEO and CFO turnover in the year of restatement announcement experience a 
significant drop in the ERC for almost three years after restatement announcements. The results 
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on auditor dismissals or audit committee chair turnover are qualitatively similar. These analyses 
indicate that increasing accounting conservatism, replacing key executives, dismissing auditors, 
and replacing audit committee chair can help restore the credibility of financial reporting.  
Given that we document a much longer drop in the ERC for material restatements than 
Wilson (2008), we conduct additional analyses to reconcile our results with Wilson’s. We 
identify two research design choices that collectively contribute to the differences. First, we 
require that each restatement firm have at least one observation in the pre-restatement period and 
one observation in the post-restatement period to facilitate pre- to post-restatement comparison. 
In contrast, Wilson’s sample is limited to observations with data available for the two quarters 
immediately surrounding restatement announcements. This sampling design cuts the sample size 
by half, reducing the power of tests. When we impose similar sample restrictions as Wilson, we 
find that the material restatement firms experience a significant drop in the ERC for eight 
quarters. The drop in the ERC for quarters 9 to 11 is of similar magnitude as in the full sample, 
but is only marginally significant. The weaker result for the restricted sample indicates that 
imposing the additional sample restriction reduces the power of tests.  
Second, as noted above, we use the accounting irregularities as classified by Hennes et al. 
to proxy for severe restatements, whereas Wilson uses market reaction upon restatement 
announcements or revenue recognition. While the different approaches have overlaps, our tests 
indicate that the discrepancy between the irregularity proxy and Wilson’s proxy is significant 
enough to lead to different results in this setting; using Wilson’s proxy in our tests leads to a 
finding of a shorter drop in the ERC, 5 quarters instead of 11 quarters. To the extent that the 
irregularity classification better captures severe restatements, using market reaction or revenue 
recognition introduces noises into the tests and biases against finding a prolonged drop in the 
7 
 
ERC.5    
This paper contributes to the literature in several important dimensions. We find that the 
adverse effect of restatements on the information content of earnings is not short-lived; rather, it 
lasts as long as three years for material restatement firms. This message is important for 
regulators, managers, as well as for researchers. It suggests that it is not easy to regain investors’ 
trust after aggressive financial reporting. Hopefully the message will act to deter firms from 
engaging in aggressive financial reporting. This paper, together with prior studies, show that 
aggressive financial reporting has long-lasting adverse impact on both corporate financing and 
the perceived quality of financial reporting. Our analyses also indicate that the nature of 
restatements and the remedies undertaken by firms significantly influence financial reporting 
credibility after restatement announcements.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the research design, 
including the empirical model, variable measurement, and sample selection. Section 3 presents 
the main analyses. Section 4 reports additional analyses and Section 5 reports analyses that 
reconcile our findings with prior research. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Research design and sample selection  
2.1 Empirical model and variable measurement 
To investigate the decline in the information content of earnings after restatement 
announcements, we examine the change in the earnings response coefficient (ERC) experienced 
by restatement firms from the pre- to the post-restatement period. We use the following 
regression model in our main tests, with the predicted signs of the impact on the ERC in 
                                                 
5 When explaining CEO/CFO turnover after restatements, Hennes et al. (2008) also note that the proxy based on the 
market reaction has less explanatory power than the accounting irregularity proxy.   
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parentheses: 
           ܷܴ௜௧ ൌ 	ߙଵ ൅ ∑ ߙଶ,௧ܴܳܶ௧ ൅ ߚଵܷܧ௜௧ ൅ ∑ ߚଶ,௧ሾܷܧ௜௧ ൈ ܴܳܶ௧ሿ ൅ ߚଷܱܰܰܮܫܰܧܣܴ௜௧ଵଶ௧ୀଵଵଶ௧ୀଵ   
																																																																							ሺ൅ሻ																																										ሺെሻ																															  
 
                         ൅	∑ ߚ௞ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ ௜ܵ௧ ൅ ∑ ߚ௞ሾܷܧ௜௧ ൈ ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ ௜ܵ௧ሿ ൅ ߝ௜௧ଵ଻௞ୀଵଵଵ଴௞ୀସ                    (1), 
 
where:   
 
          	ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ ௜ܵ௧ ൌ ሼܯܶܤ௜௧, 	ܤܧܶܣ௜௧, 	ܵܫܼܧ௜௧, 	ܮܱܵ ௜ܵ௧, 	ܳ4௜௧, 	ܴܲܧܦܫܥ ௜ܶ௧, 	ܲܧܴܵܫܵ ௜ܶ௧ሽ. 
																																															ሺ൅ሻ									ሺെሻ									ሺ൅ሻ									ሺെሻ						ሺെሻ										ሺെሻ															ሺ൅ሻ		  
 
The dependent variable, ܷܴ௜௧, is the cumulative abnormal returns in the three-day window 
around the earnings announcement for firm i in quarter t, where the abnormal return is calculated 
as the firm’s return less the CRSP value-weighted market return. ܴܳܶ௧ is an indicator variable, 
equal to 1 if the earnings announcement pertains to the tth quarter after the restatement 
announcement, and 0 otherwise. For instance, quarter 1 refers to the first fiscal quarter whose 
earnings announcement date is after the restatement announcement. ܷܧ௜௧ is firm i’s unexpected 
quarterly earnings for quarter t, scaled by price at the end of the fiscal quarter, with expected 
earnings measured as the median of analysts’ earnings forecasts issued within 60 days prior to 
quarter t’s earnings announcement.6  
In this regression, coefficient ߚଵ captures the association between unexpected returns and 
unexpected quarterly earnings, i.e., the ERC, in the pre-restatement period (the benchmark 
period). Following Wilson (2008), the benchmark period includes the five quarters prior to the 
restatement announcement, denoted as quarter -4 to quarter 0, where quarter 0 refers to the last 
                                                 
6 For quarter 1, analyst forecasts falling within the 60-day window before the earnings announcement might include 
forecasts issued before the restatement announcement. We remove such forecasts so that only forecasts made after 
the restatement announcement are used in the calculation of expected earnings. This ensures that the expected 
earnings for quarter 1 only captures analysts’ revised expectations in response to the restatement announcement. If 
after such exclusion there are no analyst forecasts issued after the restatement announcement that can be used to 
estimate expected earnings for quarter 1, we drop that particular quarter and reclassify the next quarter as quarter 1. 
This occurs to 6.2% of our sample firms. 
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fiscal quarter with an earnings announcement date before the restatement announcement.7 We 
expect ߚଵ to be positive.  
Our focus is on the change in the ERC after restatement announcements. We extend the 
post-restatement period from six quarters analyzed in Wilson (2008) to twelve quarters (i.e., 
ݐ ∈ ሼ1,2, … ,11,12ሽ) in order to capture the potential long-term decline in the ERC. We compare 
the ERC in each of these quarters with the benchmark period. The change in the ERC following 
the restatement announcement is captured by the coefficient on the interaction term ܷܧ௜௧ ൈ
ܴܳܶ௧, i. e. , ߚଶ,௧. We expect ߚଶ,௧ to be negative if there is a drop in the information content of 
earnings in quarter t relative to the benchmark period. If there is a long-term decline in the 
information content of earnings, we expect ߚଶ,௧ to be negative for more quarters subsequent to 
the restatement announcement. 
We include a series of control variables and their interactions with UEit to control for the 
impact of other factors on the ERC. The choice and measurement of control variables follow 
Wilson (2008). ܱܰܰܮܫܰܧܣܴ௜௧, defined as UEit× |UEit|, is included to control for the 
nonlinearity in the price-earnings relation. ܯܶܤ௜௧, the market-to-book ratio, is included to 
control for the impact of growth opportunities. ܵܫܼܧ௜௧, the natural log of market value of equity, 
is included to control for the impact of firm size. Both ܯܶܤ௜௧ and ܵܫܼܧ௜௧ are measured at the end 
of the fiscal quarter for which the earnings announcement is made. ܤܧܶܣ௜௧ is the market-model 
beta estimated over the previous year ending two days prior to the earnings announcement date. 
It is included to control for the impact of risk. ܮܱܵ ௜ܵ௧ is an indicator variable and is equal to one 
if the reported earnings per share is below 0. ܳ4௜௧ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
                                                 
7 Basically, we designate quarters based on the restatement announcement date. The closest earnings announcement 
before the restatement announcement pertains to quarter 0, the closest earnings announcement after the restatement 
announcement pertains to quarter 1, and so forth. We choose this approach so that the information content of 
earnings in quarter 0 is not affected by restatements, but that in quarter 1 is.   
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earnings announcement is for the fourth quarter of the fiscal year. These two indicator variables 
are included to control for the lower information content of negative earnings and fourth-quarter 
earnings, respectively. Finally, there are two control variables related to earnings properties, 
earnings predictability (ܴܲܧܦܫܥ ௜ܶ௧) and earnings persistence (ܲܧܴܵܫܵ ௜ܶ௧). ܴܲܧܦܫܥ ௜ܶ௧ is 
measured as the variance of the absolute value of unexpected earnings over the two-year period 
prior to the earnings announcement, where unexpected earnings are based on a seasonal random 
walk. The higher the value of	ܴܲܧܦܫܥ ௜ܶ௧, the less predictable earnings are, and the lower ERC 
is. ܲܧܴܵܫܵ ௜ܶ௧ is the autoregressive coefficient from Foster’s (1977) model estimated over the 
two-year period prior to the earnings announcement. The higher the value of ܲܧܴܵܫܵ ௜ܶ௧, the 
more persistent earnings are, and the higher ERC is.  
2.2 Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
A common data source of restatements is the GAO (2003) report. The report initially 
covered restatements announced from January 1997 to June 2002 and was later updated to 
include restatements in more recent years, up to the first half of 2006. In order to achieve a 
balance between a comprehensive set of restatements and the power of the test, we include all 
restatements with available data in the sample and then separately investigate the restatements 
that are classified as accounting irregularities by Hennes et al. (2008), referred to as material 
restatements, and other restatements. We expect that material restatements are associated with a 
greater loss of investors’ trust in financial reporting and hence a longer drop in the ERC, 
compared with other restatements.8 
Table 1, Panel A presents the sample selection. Unless noted, the sample selection follows 
Wilson (2008) to facilitate comparison with prior research. Starting with 2,705 restatements in 
                                                 
8 It is important to note that the GAO list may include some non-restatements. This data error can bias in favor of 
finding different results between material restatements and other restatements. At the same time, it highlights the 
importance of separately examining the drop in the ERC experienced by firms with material restatements.  
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the GAO report, we lose 341, 54, and 515 restatements due to the lack of coverage in Compustat, 
CRSP, and I/B/E/S, respectively. We lose an additional 153 restatements because they are 
announced by foreign firms. To facilitate the comparison of the ERC between the pre- and post-
restatement periods, we require that firms have at least one quarter’s data in both the pre- and the 
post-restatement period, and we lose 434 restatements as a result.9 Our full sample includes 
1,208 restatements. Of those, 343 are classified as material restatements based on Hennes et al.’s 
(2008) classification. As in prior research, we find that material restatements are associated with 
more negative market reaction in the three days around the restatement announcements than 
other restatements. The mean (median) three-day buy-and-hold market adjusted returns is -7.2% 
(-4.0%) for material restatements and -1.8% (-0.8%) for other restatements. The differences are 
significant at the 0.001 level.   
Panel B shows that our sample firms operate in a broad spectrum of industries, although 
there is a significant concentration in the business services industry (15.65 percent of the full 
sample and 23.62 percent of material restatements).10 Panel C presents the yearly distribution for 
both the full sample and the sample of material restatements. There are more observations in the 
second half of the sample period than in the first half. Lastly, Panel D shows that some firms 
have more than one restatement during the sample period. The number of distinct firms is 891 
for the full sample and 246 for the material restatement sample.11  
For each of the 1,208 restatements in the full sample, we obtain earnings announcement 
                                                 
9 Note that this requirement is less restrictive than Wilson’s (2008) requirement that firms need to have data for the 
two quarters immediately surrounding restatement announcements. For instance, if a firm has missing data in quarter 
0, but has data in quarter -1, then we include it in the sample, but Wilson excludes it. In Section 5, we examine how 
the differences in sampling restrictions affect the results.  
10 To ensure that this industry concentration does not drive our findings, we repeat our analyses after removing all 
observations in the business services industry and the untabulated results are qualitatively similar to those reported. 
These results, as well as the other untabulated results in this paper, are available from the authors upon request.  
11 In an untabulated sensitivity test, we drop the subsequent restatements from the same firm and the results are 
quantitatively similar. We find a significant drop in the ERC for three quarters for the full sample, 11 quarters for 
the sample of material restatements, and one quarter for the sample of other restatements. 
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data and other information for the five quarters before the restatement announcement and the 
twelve quarters afterward. Panel A of Table 2 reports the number of earnings announcements 
with required data for the regression analyses in each of the 17 quarters. Depending on data 
availability, the number of earnings announcements ranges from 659 in quarter 12 to 908 in 
quarter 0 for the full sample. Altogether, there are 12,859 quarterly earnings announcements with 
required data. For the material restatement sample, the number of observations ranges from 165 
in quarter 10 to 251 in quarter 0. In total, there are 3,413 firm-quarter observations. 
Panel B of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the regression variables for the full 
sample, separately for the pre- and post-restatement period.12 On average firms are riskier 
(having higher beta) and larger and earnings become less predictable after restatement 
announcements. Other firm characteristics do not change significantly around restatement 
announcements. Panel C presents descriptive statistics for the material restatement sample; the 
material restatement firms have lower market-to-book ratio and less predictable earnings after 
restatement announcements than before. Panel B and C also report descriptive statistics on firm 
age. Naturally firm age is greater in the post-restatement period. Controlling for firm age and its 
interaction with UEit in the regressions does not affect our results.   
 
3. Empirical analyses of the change in the ERC after restatement announcements  
3.1 Main analyses – Change in the ERC for the full sample 
Table 3 presents the regression results for the change in the ERC after restatement 
announcements for the full sample. For ease of interpretation, we mean-adjust the control 
                                                 
12 We also compare the pre-restatement characteristics between the restatement firms and the non-restatement firms 
in Compustat, in order to understand what type of firms tend to have restatements. We find that compared to the 
non-restatement firms in Compustat, the restatement firms on average are larger, have higher market-to-book ratio, 
are riskier, have higher stock returns and ROA, are less likely to report losses, have lower leverage, and are older. 
These findings are consistent with what is reported in prior research (e.g., Dechow et al. 2011).   
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variables so that the coefficient on UE (ߚଵ) can be interpreted as the ERC for a firm with average 
firm characteristics.13 To mitigate the impact of outliers, we delete observations with studentized 
residuals greater than 2.5 in absolute value.14 The p-values are based on standard errors adjusted 
for firm-level clustering. 
Column (1) of Table 3 reports the result for all restatements in the full sample. As 
expected, the ERC for the benchmark period (ߚଵ) is significantly positive. The decline in the 
information content of earnings seems to be short-lived. The coefficients on UE×QTR are 
significantly negative for the first three quarters and the ninth quarter following the restatement 
announcement. With respect to the interactions of UE and the control variables, we find that the 
ERC is higher for large firms and lower for firms with a loss and for the fourth fiscal quarter.  
As discussed earlier, the reduction in the information content of earnings is expected to last 
longer for material restatement firms than for other restatement firms due to the more serious 
credibility issues associated with material restatements. To investigate this possibility, we rerun 
the regression separately for material restatements and other restatements, and report the 
corresponding results in columns (2) and (3) of Table 3, respectively. As expected, we find that 
the decline in the ERC is much more prolonged for material restatement firms. The coefficient 
on UE×QTR is significantly negative for 11 quarters after restatement announcements. That is, 
material restatement firms experience a significant reduction in the ERC for almost three years 
after restatement announcements. The magnitude of the reduction in the ERC is also 
economically significant. The ERC for the benchmark period is 3.298 and the average decrease 
in the ERC for the 11 quarters after restatement announcements is 1.853, a 56% decrease.  Also, 
the reduction in the ERC exhibits a decreasing trend, being the highest in the first year and the 
                                                 
13 Specifically, we standardize each control variable by subtracting its sample mean and then scaling the difference 
by its standard deviation. 
14 Using different cut-off points for studentized residuals does not change our inferences. 
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lowest in the third year after restatement announcements, consistent with material restatement 
firms gradually regaining investors’ trust over time.  
In contrast, for the other restatements, we find that the drop in the ERC is significantly 
negative only for the first quarter after restatement announcements. This indicates that the drop 
in the information content of earnings after restatement announcements is short-lived for the 
other restatement firms.15  
In summary, our analyses indicate that material restatement firms experience a prolonged 
drop in the information content of earnings after restatement announcements.16 The significant 
drop in the ERC lasts for almost three years. In contrast, other restatement firms only experience 
a significant drop in the ERC for the first quarter after restatement announcements. Therefore, 
the finding that the full sample of restatement firms experiences a short-lived drop in the ERC 
after restatement announcements is driven by the inclusion of other restatements.  
3.2 Using alternative data sources of restatements – Audit Analytics (AA) 
In the above analyses, we use the GAO restatements to be consistent with prior research. 
As a robustness check, we replicate the analyses using the restatements obtained from the Audit 
Analytics database, which covers the restatements announced since 2000. Since we need three 
years’ data to gauge the post-restatement change in the ERC, our full sample includes 2,033 
restatements over the period 2000-2008. We classify a restatement as a material restatement if it 
is indicated as a fraud in the AA database, or if it is associated with an AAER (Accounting and 
                                                 
15 As discussed earlier, we control for the market-to-book ratio and whether the firm reports a loss. Thus, the 
difference in the results between material restatements and other restatements is unlikely to be driven by the 
difference in the extent of financial distress.  
16 It is possible that the uncertainty created by the investigation adversely affects the level of ERC in the post-
restatement period. However, this possibility is also consistent with the adverse consequences of material 
restatements. At the same time, our additional analyses in Section 4.1 provide direct evidence that investors’ 
concerns with credibility of financial reporting contribute to the long-term drop in ERC after restatement 
announcements.  
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Auditing Enforcement Releases from the SEC).17 As a result, 211 restatements are classified as 
material restatements.18 Table 4 reports the results. Similar to Table 3, material restatement firms 
experience a significant drop in the ERC for a prolonged period, 10 quarters after the restatement 
announcement, and other restatements only experience a significant drop in the ERC for two 
quarters after restatement announcements.19  
Overall, the analyses indicate that our results are robust to the use of alternative sources of 
restatements and alternative ways of classifying material restatements. These findings confirm 
the generalizability of our findings.  
3.3 Additional analyses and sensitivity checks 
In this section, we discuss the additional analyses and sensitivity checks to provide 
additional insights and ensure that our results are robust. We do not tabulate the results to save 
space.  
Change in the ERC for the matching non-restatement firms 
Since we examine the change in the ERC over time for restatement firms, the change in 
macroeconomic conditions can potentially affect the results. This concern is alleviated given that 
we find different results for material restatement and other restatement firms, which experience 
similar changes in macroeconomic conditions over the same sample period. Nevertheless, to 
further address this concern, we examine the change in the ERC for a group of firms matched on 
                                                 
17 We obtain AAER cases from the Center for Financing Reporting and Management (CFRM) at the University of 
California, Berkeley. CFRM compiles the list from the original AAERs of the SEC, using the same data collection 
procedures as in Dechow et al. (2011) but covering a longer time period (1982-2010). See Dechow et al. (2011) for a 
detailed description of the data collection. 
18 We use a combination of the fraud indicator in AA and AAERs to reduce the likelihood of misclassifying material 
restatements and to increase the power of tests. Using the fraud indicator alone can lead to low power of tests 
because the percentage of restatements classified as frauds in AA is quite low. Among the 2,033 restatements in our 
AA restatement sample, only 61 are indicated as frauds in the AA database. Therefore we supplement the fraud 
indicator with AAERs, which have been widely used in the literature to capture accounting-related frauds. 
19 According to Audit Analytics, a small proportion of the restatements (about 5%) might not be due to accounting 
rule application failures. In a sensitivity test, we exclude these restatements and find quantitatively similar results.  
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industry membership (2-digit SIC codes), reporting period, and earnings predictability. 
Specifically, we use all Compustat firms without restatements during the sample period as the 
matching pool. For each restatement firm in quarter 0, we pick a matching firm in the same 
quarter and industry that has the closest earnings predictability. We then estimate regression (1) 
for the matching firms. We find that the matching firms do not experience a significant decrease 
in the ERC in the “post-restatement period,” suggesting that our results are not driven by changes 
in macroeconomic conditions during the sample period.  
Restatements announced before and after the SOX 
As indicated in Panel C of Table 1, our sample includes restatements announced both 
before and after the Sarbanes and Oxley Act (SOX). In a sensitivity analysis, we separate 
restatements announced before the SOX from those announced after. We find that the results are 
generally weaker in the post-SOX period; material restatements announced in the post-SOX 
period are associated with a decrease in the ERC for eight quarters, while those announced in the 
pre-SOX period are associated with a decrease in the ERC for 11 quarters. This can be due to the 
change in the nature of restatements (e.g., Plumlee and Yohn 2010), the lack of investor attention 
because of an unusually large number of restatement announcements in the post-SOX period 
(e.g., Burks 2011), and/or the general increase in reporting quality and corporate governance in 
the post-SOX period (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008). Nonetheless, our main inference holds for both 
before and after the SOX – material restatement firms experience a long-term decline in the 
information content of earnings after restatement announcements.  
The pre-SOX period (1997-2002) coincides with the sample period in Wilson (2008). The 
finding that the results for the period 1997-2002 are quantitatively similar to those for the full 
sample indicates that our inferences are not attributed to the expansion of the sample period. 
Using AAER cases to classify material restatements 
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To investigate the generalizability of our findings, we use an alternative way to classify 
material restatements. Specifically, we classify a restatement as a material restatement if it is 
associated with an AAER. AAERs have been widely used in the literature to capture accounting-
related frauds (e.g., Dechow et al. 1995; Dechow et al. 2011). Based on this approach, 197 of the 
1,208 restatements in the full sample are classified as material restatements. The list of 
accounting irregularities based on Hennes et al. (2008), consisting of 343 restatements in the full 
sample, is likely more comprehensive, since Hennes et al. identify not only cases subject to SEC 
investigations but also those subject to the investigation by the Department of Justice or 
investors. The AAER cases, on the other hand, are based on publicly available information. We 
replicate our analyses using this alternative classification of material restatements. The results 
remain qualitatively similar. Obtaining similar results using the AAER cases indicates that our 
results are robust to alternative ways of classifying material restatements and helps enhance the 
generalizability of our findings.  
The change in analyst coverage after restatement announcements 
A potential explanation for our results that material restatement firms experience a long-
lived drop in the ERC is that these firms are covered by fewer financial analysts after restatement 
announcements and as a result, consensus analyst forecast is a less accurate proxy for expected 
earnings. To investigate whether this is the case, we examine the change in analyst coverage 
from the pre- to the post-restatement period for material restatement firms. We find that the level 
of analyst coverage is relatively stable. For material restatement firms, the average number of 
analysts following drops only slightly from 14 in the pre-restatement period to 12 in the post-
restatement period. This suggests that the decline in the ERC for material restatement firms is not 
due to substantially lower analyst coverage in the post-restatement period. 
Using the random walk model to estimate expected earnings   
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In the above analyses, we use analysts’ forecasts issued in the 60-day window prior to 
earnings announcement to proxy for expected earnings. While analysts’ forecasts are generally 
more accurate than the estimates from the random walk model, the drawback is that the sample 
size is smaller. In a sensitivity test, we use the seasonal random walk model to estimate the 
expected earnings. The sample size increases to 1,759 restatements and 24,667 firm-quarters. 
The results are qualitatively similar. We find that the drop in the ERC after the restatement 
announcement is significant for five out of 12 quarters for the full sample of restatements, 12 
quarters for material restatement firms, and only one quarter for other restatement firms. The 
results are also similar if we restrict the sample period to 1997-2002. These results indicate that 
the documented results are robust to alternative measures of earnings surprises.  
 
4. Cross-sectional analyses 
In this section, we explore what factors affect the variation in the drop in the ERC. Since, 
as reported above, only material restatement firms experience a prolonged drop in the ERC, we 
focus on these restatement firms in the cross-sectional analyses. 
4.1 Financial reporting credibility and the drop in ERC 
In this section, we examine whether the restatement firms that are more susceptible to 
investors’ concerns with financial reporting credibility experience a drop in the ERC for a longer 
period. The key argument underlying the drop in the ERC after restatement announcements is 
that the credibility of financial reporting is lower. If this is the case, we expect to observe a more 
persistent drop in the ERC for earnings news that is more subject to credibility concerns. We use 
two proxies to identify such firms. First, prior studies suggest that investors are more suspicious 
of good news than of bad news disclosed by the firm (e.g., Skinner 1994, 1997). Thus, we expect 
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the drop in the ERC to persist for a longer period for good news than for bad news earnings 
announcements. Second, prior research suggests that high accrual firms have lower earnings 
quality (e.g., Dechow et al. 1996; Sloan 1996; Gleason et al. 2008). As a result, we expect the 
drop in the ERC to persist for a longer period for firms with high accruals than for those with 
low accruals. 
To test the first prediction, we separate the firm-quarters based on the sign of unexpected 
earnings. The good (bad) news group includes the firm-quarters with positive (negative) 
unexpected earnings. We then rerun regression (1) separately for the good news and bad news 
groups and report the results in Panel A of Table 5. As reported in the table, the good news group 
experiences a significant drop in the ERC for 11 quarters after restatement announcements. In 
contrast, the bad news group experiences a significant drop in the ERC only for three quarters in 
the post-restatement period (the second, sixth, and ninth quarters).  
To test the second prediction, we separate the firm-quarters based on the level of total 
accruals. Following Gleason et al. (2008), we calculate total accruals as income before 
extraordinary items minus the sum of operating cash flows and investing cash flows, scaled by 
total assets. The high (low) accrual group refers to firm-quarters with total accruals higher 
(lower) than industry means based on all non-restating firms in Compustat in that quarter. We 
define industries based on the Fama and French classification. (The results are similar if we 
define industries based on 3-digit SICs.) We then rerun regression (1) separately for high and 
low accrual firms and report the results in Panel B of Table 5. Consistent with our prediction, we 
find that the high accrual firms experience a significant drop in the ERC for 11 quarters after 
restatement announcements, while the low accrual firms have a significant drop in the ERC only 
for three quarters.  
20 
 
Overall, the above findings are consistent with firms with greater credibility issues 
experiencing a more persistent drop in the ERC after restatement announcements, providing 
corroborative evidence to our main analyses.   
4.2 What can firms do to improve financial reporting credibility 
In this section, we examine whether the drop in the ERC experienced by restatement firms 
vary with the remedies undertaken by firms to improve financial reporting credibility. 
Specifically, we focus on firms’ actions related to financial reporting and the parties that have the 
most direct impact on financial reporting quality: increase in accounting conservatism and 
turnover of the senior management, external auditors, and audit committee chair.20 This focus is 
motivated by prior findings as well as the views of regulators and practitioners. In its exposure 
draft for the conceptual framework for financial reporting, the FASB (2008, BC2.43) stresses 
that “whether users consider the information in an entity’s financial report to be credible will 
depend heavily on their view of the trustworthiness of the entity’s management and auditors, as 
well as on their view of the relevance of the information in the report and the degree to which it 
faithfully represents the underlying economic phenomena (emphasis added).” Practitioners share 
similar views. As quoted in GAO (2003), one industry expert comments that “too often, 
restatements involve both management pressing and exceeding the limits of reasonable 
accounting interpretations of GAAP and apparent auditor agreement and even participation in the 
reporting choices that ultimately require restatement (p. 39).” 
For this purpose, we estimate the following regression: 
                                                 
20 Note that Wilson (2008) also studies the impact of executive turnover and external auditor dismissals. Among the 
restatement firms, she finds that the decline in the ERC after restatement announcements is longer for firms without 
CEO turnovers or auditor dismissals than for other firms. However, she finds that even restatement firms without 
CEO turnovers or auditor dismissals experience a short-term drop in the ERC, three quarters after restatement 
announcements. Our finding based on material restatements contrasts with Wilson (2008). The research design 
differences, as discussed in Section 5, potentially explain the differences in results.  
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(2), 
where Changei is an indicator for the event of interest, i.e., increase in conservatism, executive 
turnover, auditor dismissal, or audit committee chair turnover. It is set to one for material 
restatement firms that experience such an event in the specified period after restatement 
announcements and zero otherwise. Under this specification, coefficient βଵ captures ERC in the 
benchmark period for restatement firms without such an event and coefficient ߚଶ,௧ captures the 
change in the ERC for these firms in the quarters after restatement announcements. Thus, ߚଵ + 
ߚଶ,௧ measures the level of ERC for these firms in the post-restatement period. Coefficient ߚଷ 
captures the difference in ERC in the benchmark period between restatement firms with such an 
event and those without, and coefficient ߚସ,௧ captures the incremental change in the ERC in the 
post-restatement period for restatement firms with such an event relative to those without. Thus, 
for restatement firms with such an event, ߚଵ + ߚଷ captures the level of ERC in the benchmark 
period, ߚଶ,௧  + ߚସ,௧ captures the change in the ERC, and ߚଵ + ߚଶ,௧ + ߚଷ + ߚସ,௧ captures the level of 
ERC in the post-restatement period. The interpretation of the coefficients is summarized as 
follows: 
 
material restatement firms 
without the event 
material restatement 
firms with the event 
ERC in the pre-
restatement period βଵ ߚଵ + ߚଷ 
ERC in the post-
restatement period ߚଵ + ߚଶ,௧ ߚଵ  + ߚଷ + ߚଶ,௧+ ߚସ,௧ 
 
Change in the ERC ߚଶ,௧ ߚଶ,௧  + ߚସ,௧ 
 
Note that our focus is on ߚଶ,௧ and ߚଶ,௧ + ߚସ,௧, which capture the change in the ERC from the pre- 
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to the post-restatement period for material restatement firms without and with the event of 
interest, respectively. We do not present all the individual coefficients in order to simplify the 
table presentation. Instead, we present summaries of the results, including the ERC in the 
benchmark period and the change in the ERC after restatement announcements, separately for 
material restatements with and without the remedy under study.  
Increase in accounting conservatism 
Given that material restatement firms on average report aggressively in the past (e.g., 
Ettredge et al. 2012) and such aggressive reporting practices contribute to investors’ concerns 
with reporting credibility, we expect that restatement firms that significantly increase accounting 
conservatism experience a drop in the ERC for a shorter period than other restatement firms. We 
measure accounting conservatism using the C-Score developed by Khan and Watts (2009). We 
test whether the restatement firms that have an increase in C-Score from the year before the 
restatement (i.e., year t-1) to the year after (i.e., year t+1) experience a shorter period of decrease 
in the ERC than other restatement firms.21  
The results are reported in Panel A of Table 6. The indicator, Changei, is defined as one for 
firms with an increase in C-Score. We find that consistent with our prediction, the restatement 
firms that report more conservatively in the post-restatement period experience a significant 
decrease in the ERC for a shorter period than the other restatement firms (6 quarters vs. 11 
quarters). This result indicates that increasing conservatism can bolster investors’ confidence in 
reported earnings. 
Executive turnover 
Prior research finds that restatement firms experience a significantly higher frequency of 
                                                 
21 We use year t-1 and year t+1 to measure the change in conservatism because investors likely need time to 
understand the implications of accounting policy changes. We obtain qualitatively similar and slightly weaker 
results when we use year t-1 and year t to measure the change in conservatism. 
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executive turnover after restatement announcements compared to other firms (e.g., Desai et al. 
2006; Hennes et al. 2008). The common presumption is that firing the key executives can help 
restore financial reporting credibility. To test whether this is the case, we define Changei as one 
for restatement firms with both CEO and CFO turnover in the year of restatement announcement, 
and zero otherwise. Because Hennes et al. (2008) find that most material restatement firms 
experience a turnover of either CEO or CFO after restatement announcements, we focus on the 
turnover of both CEO and CFO to increase the power of our tests.22  
We collect information on executives from 8-K. We find that of the 343 material 
restatements, 26.6% experience turnover of both CEO and CFO in the year of restatement 
announcement. Table 6, Panel B presents the regression results. As reported in the table, material 
restatement firms without CEO/CFO turnover experience a significant drop in the ERC in all the 
post-restatement quarters examined, except for quarter 12. The drop in the ERC ranges from 
1.030 in quarter 10 to 2.776 in quarter 4. In contrast, material restatement firms with CEO/CFO 
turnover only experience a significant drop in the ERC for the second, third, and fourth quarter 
after restatement announcements.  
Auditor dismissal 
Prior research finds that restatement firms experience a significantly higher frequency of 
auditor turnovers compared to other firms (e.g., Hennes et al. 2012). While some of the auditor 
turnovers are auditor resignations, others are auditor dismissals initiated by the firm. Hennes et 
al. (2012) find that auditor resignations for restatement firms are associated with a negative 
                                                 
22 If a restatement firm only replaces either CEO or CFO in this period, Changei is coded as zero. Also, if a 
restatement firm replaces both CEO and CFO before restatement announcements but still in the fiscal year of 
restatement announcement, Changei is coded as one. Hennes et al. (2008) find that some restatement firms replace 
executives before they make the restatement announcement as a signal of their determination to improve financial 
reporting quality. Also, the results are similar if we use CEO and CFO turnover in the year of restatement 
announcement and the year after. 
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market reaction, but auditor dismissals are associated with a positive market reaction. This 
finding is consistent with auditor dismissals signaling firms’ determination to improve financial 
reporting quality and the market viewing auditor dismissals as good news. Consequently, we 
expect that financial reporting credibility after auditor dismissals is higher compared to other 
restatement firms. To test this prediction, we define Changei as one for material restatement 
firms with auditor dismissals in the year of the restatement announcement, and zero otherwise.23 
We collect auditor dismissal information from 8-K and Audit Analytics. We find that of the 343 
material restatements, 14.5% are associated with auditor dismissals in the year of the restatement 
announcement.  
Table 6, Panel C presents the regression results. As reported in the table, material 
restatement firms without auditor dismissals experience a significant drop in the ERC for 11 
quarters after restatement announcements. The drop in the ERC ranges from 1.161 in quarter 7 to 
2.724 in quarter 3. In contrast, material restatement firms with auditor dismissals only experience 
a significant drop in the ERC for four quarters in the post-restatement period.  
Audit committee chair turnover 
Audit committee is directly involved in the monitoring of financial reporting processes. 
Like replacing top executives and dismissing external auditors, replacing audit committee chair 
can also help improve financial reporting credibility. To test this prediction, we define Changei 
as one for material restatement firms that replace the chair of audit committee in the year of 
restatement announcement, and zero otherwise. We collect information on audit committee chair 
turnover from the IRRC, Board Analyst, and/or the proxy statement. We find that 30.3% of the 
material restatement firms replace the audit committee chair by the end of the year of restatement 
announcement.  
                                                 
23 Changei is coded as zero for accounting irregularity firms with auditor resignations in this period. 
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The results are reported in Table 6, Panel D. We find that while the material restatement 
firms with audit committee chair turnover experience a significant drop in the ERC for four 
quarters after restatement announcements, those without audit committee chair turnover 
experience a significant drop in the ERC for 12 quarters after restatement announcements.  
The analyses in this section indicate that undertaking prompt actions, such as increasing 
accounting conservatism, replacing CEO and CFO, dismissing external auditors, and replacing 
the audit committee chair, can significantly improve financial reporting credibility. While 
material restatement firms that undertake such remedies only experience a brief drop in the ERC, 
those that do not experience a significant drop in the ERC for almost three years after 
restatement announcements.  
 
5. Change in the ERC for the restricted sample – Reconciliation with Wilson (2008)  
We find that material restatement firms experience a long lasting reduction in the 
information content of earnings after restatement announcements. This contrasts with Wilson’s 
(2008) finding that the drop in the information content of earnings is short-lived even for more 
severe restatements. In this section, we explore how the research design differences between our 
study and Wilson explain the discrepancy. We investigate two research design choices where 
Wilson differs from our study. First, Wilson imposes more restrictive sampling requirement by 
requiring that firms have complete data in the two quarters immediately surrounding restatement 
announcements. Second, Wilson uses different proxies for material restatements, proxies based 
on market reactions to restatement announcements or revenue recognition.  
The impact of additional sample restriction 
Following Wilson (2008), we now impose the requirement that firms have sufficient data to 
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compute all the variables used in the analyses for the two quarters immediately surrounding the 
restatement announcement (i.e., quarter 0 and quarter 1). As a result, 567 restatements, or 47% of 
the full sample, are dropped and the restricted sample includes 641 restatements, 167 of which 
are classified as accounting irregularities by Hennes et al. (2008). 24  
Table 7 reports the regression results for the restricted sample, using the same model 
specification as in Table 3. The impact of the additional sample restriction can be seen by 
comparing the results for material restatements in the restricted sample with those in the full 
sample (i.e., Column (2) of Table 7 versus Column (2) of Table 3). The comparison suggests that 
by relaxing the sample restriction, the decline in the ERC for material restatement firms extends 
from eight quarters to 11 quarters, due to the increased power of tests that result from a 
significantly larger sample size. While the estimated drop in the ERC in Table 3 has similar 
magnitude as in Table 7, it has a higher significance level. For example, ߚଵଵis -1.564 with a p-
value of 0.022 in Table 3 and is -1.375 with a p-value of 0.106 in Table 7. The larger sample size 
in Table 3, with about 70% more firm-quarter observations than in Table 7, leads to smaller 
estimated standard errors for the coefficients and hence increased power of tests. 
To understand why this seemingly innocuous sampling requirement leads to such a large 
drop in sample size, we examine firm characteristics, restatement characteristics, and future 
performance of the firms included in the restricted sample and those excluded. The untabulated 
analyses suggest that the large sample attrition arises mainly due to analysts’ overall low 
tendency to update their quarterly forecasts prior to earnings announcements. For the full sample 
of restatements, in the year before restatement announcements, the median number of analysts 
following a firm is 8, but the median number of quarterly earnings forecasts issued by analysts in 
                                                 
24 Wilson’s sample includes 215 restatements over the period 1997-2002. Our inferences remain the same if we limit 
the restatements to those announced over the period 1997-2002.  
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the 60-day window before each earnings announcement is only 2. The statistics are similar for 
the year after restatement announcements (the numbers are 7 and 1.75, respectively). These 
numbers indicate that for each quarter, only about one-fourth of the analysts following the firm 
issue updated quarterly earnings forecasts prior to the earnings announcement. As a result, when 
we require updated quarterly forecast for both quarters 0 and 1 to calculate expected earnings, a 
significant proportion of the sample firms are excluded.  
It is thus not surprising that we find that the excluded firms have fewer analysts following 
and are therefore less likely to have updated quarterly forecasts before earnings announcements. 
In the year before restatement announcements, the mean number of analysts following is 13.91 
for the included firms, but it is only 7.41 for the excluded firms. Due to the difference in analyst 
coverage, it is much less likely for the excluded firms to have updated quarterly earnings 
forecasts prior to earnings announcements, in the quarters both before and after restatement 
announcements. This explains why these firms are excluded once the availability of updated 
quarterly forecasts in quarters 0 and 1 is required.  
We also compare the included and excluded firms along other dimensions. We find that the 
primary difference between these two sets of firms is related to size, age, and growth potential 
(the market-to-book ratio). The excluded firms are much smaller, are younger, and have lower 
market-to-book ratios than the included firms. The mean of total assets is $2,616 million for the 
excluded firms but $11,157 million for the included firms. The mean of firm age, measured as 
the number of years since the firm first appeared in CRSP, is 16.3 years for the excluded firms 
but 19.1 years for the included firms. The mean market-to-book ratio is 2.19 for the excluded 
firms but 2.67 for the included firms. These differences likely explain why the two sets of firms 
differ greatly in analyst coverage.   
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In terms of restatement characteristics, there is some evidence that the restatements of the 
excluded firms are more severe – the proportion of restatements related to revenue recognition is 
higher (35.2% vs. 30.0%, with a p-value of 0.078), and the restatement magnitude is more 
negative (-4.7% of total assets vs. -2.4%, with a p-value of 0.023), while the restatement 
announcement return and the number of restated quarters are similar for the excluded and 
included firms. The two sets of firms are also similar in future performance and the probability 
of delisting (over the three-year period after the restatement announcement).  
In sum, our comparison of the included and excluded firms suggests that the main reason 
for a firm to be excluded from the restricted sample is because of its smaller firm size and lower 
analyst coverage, which directly leads to a lower number of updated quarterly earnings forecasts.  
The impact of different proxies for material restatements 
Wilson (2008) finds that the significant drop in ERC for three quarters is mainly driven by 
the more severe restatements. Wilson uses restatements with more negative market reaction and 
revenue recognition related restatements to proxy for more severe restatements, whereas we use 
the accounting irregularities as classified by Hennes et al. (2008). We conduct additional 
analyses to gauge the impact of using different proxies on the results. Since Wilson use two 
approaches to identify severe restatements, we examine each approach in turn. For brevity, we 
do not tabulate the results, which are available upon request.  
With respect to the proxy based on market reaction, we find that despite a significant 
overlap, the discrepancy between this proxy and the irregularity proxy is significant. By design, 
half of the 1,208 restatements in the full sample are classified as restatements with more negative 
market reactions and half as restatements with less negative market reactions.  Of the 343 
material restatements classified as accounting irregularities per Hennes et al., 212 are classified 
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as having more negative market reactions and the rest, 131, as having less negative market 
reactions. One possible reason for the discrepancy is that the market reaction around the 
restatement announcement may not fully incorporate the implication of the restatement. When 
we rerun the regressions, we find that the restatements with more negative market reaction 
experience a significant drop in the ERC for five quarters in the post-restatement period, a period 
much shorter compared to when the irregularity proxy is used (Column (2) of Table 3).  
The findings are similar with respect to the proxy using revenue recognition to identify 
severe restatements. Of the 1016 restatements with known reasons, 328 restatements (about 32 
percent) are related to revenue recognition. Of the 291 restatements with known reasons 
classified as accounting irregularities per Hennes et al., 143 are related to revenue recognition 
and 148 are related to other reasons. Restatements related to other reasons can also be severe. 
The regression results show that the restatements related to revenue recognition experience a 
significant drop in the ERC for five quarters in the post-restatement period, again shorter than 
when the irregularity proxy is used.  
Overall, the above analyses suggest that despite the overlap, the discrepancy between the 
irregularity proxy and Wilson’s proxies is significant enough to lead to different regression 
results.  To the extent that the irregularity classification better captures severe restatements, using 
the market reaction or revenue recognition introduces noises into the tests and leads to less 
powerful tests.  
Summary of the reconciliation with Wilson (2008) 
In summary, we find that the two research design choices, different sampling requirement 
and different proxies for material restatements, likely explain the differences in findings between 
our study and Wilson (2008). By using less restrictive sampling requirements and potentially 
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more powerful proxy for material restatements, our analyses are able to detect the long-run drop 
in the ERC after restatement announcements. We would like to emphasize that given that Wilson 
(2008) and Hennes et al. (2008) are contemporaneous work, separating out accounting 
irregularities is not feasible when Wilson conducted her study; our tests are built upon, and 
benefit from the insights in, both studies.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the drop in the information content of earnings after 
restatement announcements. Our sample includes 1,208 restatements announced over the period 
1997-2006, of which 343 are classified as accounting irregularities per Hennes et al. (2008) –
referred to as material restatements. Using the ERC to proxy for the information content of 
earnings, we find that the drop in the ERC from the pre- to the post-restatement period is both 
pronounced and long-lived for material restatement firms. The drop in the ERC is significantly 
negative for 11 quarters after restatement announcements and the average magnitude of the drop 
is more than half of the ERC in the pre-restatement period. In contrast, the drop in the ERC for 
other restatement firms only lasts for one quarter. We find that our results are not driven by 
contemporaneous changes in economic conditions and are also robust to using alternative 
sources of restatements (i.e., Audit Analytics), alternative classifications of material restatements 
(e.g., AAER cases), and alternative ways of calculating expected earnings (i.e., seasonal random 
walk model). 
In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the long-lived drop in the ERC experienced by 
material restatement firms is driven by those firm-quarters that are more likely to be subject to 
credibility concerns, such as those reporting good news, i.e., those reporting earnings higher than 
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analyst consensus forecasts, and those with high accruals. This provides further support to the 
notion that the reduction in the information content of earnings after restatement announcements 
is related to loss of financial reporting credibility. In addition, we find that material restatement 
firms that take prompt actions to enhance reporting credibility, by increasing accounting 
conservatism, removing CEO and CFO, dismissing external auditors, and replacing the chair of 
audit committee, experience a relatively short-lived drop in the ERC, only in the first year after 
restatement announcements. In contrast, for material restatement firms that do not take such 
prompt actions, the drop in the ERC lasts for almost three years. These analyses indicate that 
taking remedial actions in a timely fashion helps firms regain investors’ trust.  
Lastly, we reconcile our finding with Wilson (2008) who concludes that the drop in the 
information content of earnings is short-lived. We find that the discrepancy in inferences arises 
from two research design differences. First, Wilson requires that restatement firms have 
complete data in the two quarters immediately surrounding restatement announcements, and this 
requirement reduces the power of tests by decreasing the sample size by half. Second, Wilson’s 
proxy of severe restatements is based on the market reaction or revenue recognition. Our 
analyses suggest that imposing a less restrictive sampling criterion – requiring data in at least one 
quarter in both the pre- and the post-restatement period – and using a potentially more powerful 
proxy for severe restatements enable us to increase the power of tests and detect the long-run 
drop in the ERC experienced by the material restatement firms. 
Our study has important implications for investors, regulators, firms, and academia. We 
find that after restatement announcements, the reduction in the information content of earnings 
for material restatement firms lasts much longer than previously documented. This finding helps 
investors, regulators, as well as firms, better understand the adverse consequences of aggressive 
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financial reporting and the impact of the remedial actions undertaken by firms to regain 
investors’ trust in accounting numbers. Our finding also reconciles the conflicting evidence in 
prior studies about the capital market consequences of restatements.  
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TABLE 1 
Sample selection and descriptive statistics of restatements 
 
This table describes the selection process of the sample, 1,208 restatements announced in the period 
1997-2006, and the characteristics of the restatements.  
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
 
This panel describes the sample selection process, first for the full sample and then for the restricted 
sample. The selection of the restricted sample follows Wilson (2008), who requires that firms have 
sufficient data to compute variables for the two quarters immediately surrounding the restatement 
announcement – quarter 0 and quarter 1.(Quarter 0 refers to the last fiscal quarter with the earnings 
announcement date before the restatement announcement. Quarter 1 refers to the first fiscal quarter with 
the earnings announcement date after the restatement announcement.) The main reason for the loss of 
restatements due to this restriction is the lack of analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S for quarter 0 or quarter 
1. 
 
Restrictions  
Sample 
size
 
Accounting restatements in the period 1997-2006 (per GAO reports)  
 
2,705
 
Less:  
Firms not covered in Compustat 341 
Firms not covered in CRSP 54 
Firms not covered in I/B/E/S 515 
Foreign firms  153 
Firms  with missing data throughout either the pre-restatement period 
(quarter -4 to quarter 0) or the post-restatement period (quarter 1 to quarter 
12) 434 
 
Restatements in the full sample   1,208
Material restatements, i.e., accounting irregularities per Hennes et al. (2008)  343
Other restatements   865
 
Less:  
Firms with missing data in quarter 0 or quarter 1  567 
 
Restatements in the restricted sample  641
Material restatements, i.e., accounting irregularities per Hennes et al. (2008)  167
Other restatements   474
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TABLE 1 (cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Industry distribution of restatement firms in the full sample 
 
  All restatements  Material restatements 
Industry (per Fama and French 
classification)  
 # of 
restatements 
Percentage 
of total 
 # of 
restatements 
Percentage of 
total 
Apparel  12 0.99%  5 1.46% 
Automobiles and Trucks  23 1.90%  10 2.92% 
Banking  90 7.45%  21 6.12% 
Business Services  189 15.65%  81 23.62% 
Business Supplies  15 1.24%  3 0.87% 
Communication  54 4.47%  16 4.66% 
Computers  62 5.13%  30 8.75% 
Defense  13 1.08%  0 0.00% 
Electronic Equipment  49 4.06%  17 4.96% 
Entertainment  21 1.74%  5 1.46% 
Food Products  14 1.16%  3 0.87% 
Healthcare  18 1.49%  6 1.75% 
Insurance  39 3.23%  12 3.50% 
Machinery  46 3.81%  17 4.96% 
Medical Equipment  14 1.16%  2 0.58% 
Personal Services  24 1.99%  11 3.21% 
Petroleum and Natural Gas  47 3.89%  6 1.75% 
Pharmaceutical Products  42 3.48%  16 4.66% 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels  31 2.57%  2 0.58% 
Retail  123 10.18%  14 4.08% 
Trading  23 1.90%  5 1.46% 
Transportation  24 1.99%  4 1.17% 
Utilities  46 3.81%  14 4.08% 
Wholesale  29 2.40%  9 2.62% 
All others  160 13.25%  34 9.91% 
       
Total  1,208 100%  343 100% 
 
  
37 
 
TABLE 1 (cont’d) 
 
Panel C: Yearly distribution of restatement announcements in the full sample 
 
  All restatements  Material restatements 
Restatement 
announcement year 
 # of 
restatements 
Percentage 
of total 
 # of 
restatements 
Percentage 
of total 
1997  27 2.24%  11 3.21% 
1998  29 2.40%  14 4.08% 
1999  70 5.79%  16 4.66% 
2000  63 5.22%  17 4.96% 
2001  96 7.95%  19 5.54% 
2002  146 12.09%  63 18.37% 
2003  144 11.92%  46 13.41% 
2004  164 13.58%  54 15.74% 
2005  351 29.06%  78 22.74% 
2006 a  118 9.77%  25 7.29% 
 
Total 
  
1,208 
 
100% 
  
343 
 
100% 
 
a The GAO report only covers restatement announcements up to the first half of 2006. 
 
 
Panel D: Restatement frequency at the firm level for the full sample 
 
  All restatements  Material restatements  
 
 
 # of distinct 
firms 
# of restatements 
represented 
 # of distinct 
firms 
# of restatements 
represented 
One restatement   670 670  179 179 
Two restatements  158 316  47 94 
Three restatements   46 138  15 45 
Four or more restatements  17 84  5 25 
 
Total  891 1,208  246 343 
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TABLE 2 
Earnings announcement frequency and descriptive statistics on the regression variables 
 
Panel A: Earnings announcement frequency 
 
This table reports the number of firms with earnings announcements and data on regression variables in 
each of the 17 quarters around restatement announcements. Quarter 0 refers to the last fiscal quarter with 
the earnings announcement date before the restatement announcement. Quarter 1 refers to the first fiscal 
quarter with the earnings announcement date after the restatement announcement. Other quarters are 
defined accordingly. The full sample includes 1,208 restatements announced in the period 1997-2006, 
including 343 material restatements and 865 other restatements.  
 
Quarter  All restatements  Material restatements 
-4  760  220 
-3  785  227 
-2  823  234 
-1  828  231 
0  908  251 
1  782  203 
2  805  212 
3  775  194 
4  740  190 
5  769  191 
6  713  181 
7  707  184 
8  690  194 
9  747  192 
10  677  165 
11  691  175 
12  659  169 
 
Total  12,859  3,413 
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TABLE 2 (cont’d) 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics on the regression variables: All restatements in the full sample 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics on the variables used in the regression analyses for all 
restatements included in the full sample, separately for the pre- and post-restatement period. The 
descriptive statistics are based on 12,859 firm-quarters with required data from 1,208 restatements 
announced in the period 1997-2006. The pre-restatement period includes quarter -4 to quarter 0 and the 
post-restatement period includes quarter 1 to quarter 12. 
UR is the cumulative abnormal returns in the three-day window around the earnings announcement date, 
where the abnormal return is calculated as the firm’s return less the CRSP value-weighted market return. 
UE is the unexpected quarterly earnings at the earnings announcement date, scaled by price at the end of 
the fiscal quarter, with expected earnings proxied by the median of analyst forecasts issued within 60 days 
prior to the earnings announcement date. NONLINEAR is defined as ܷܧ×|ܷܧ|. MTB is the market-to-
book ratio. BETA is the market-model beta estimated over the year ending two days prior to the earnings 
announcement date. SIZE is the natural log of market value of equity. LOSS is an indicator variable equal 
to one if reported earnings per share is below 0. Q4 is an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the earnings 
announcement is for the fourth quarter of the fiscal year. PREDICT is the variance of the absolute values 
of unexpected earnings over the two-year period prior to the earnings announcement, where unexpected 
earnings are based on a seasonal random walk. PERSIST is the autoregressive coefficient from Foster’s 
(1977) model estimated over the two-year period prior to the earnings announcement. AGE is measured as 
the number of years since the firm first appeared in CRSP. 
Variable Mean Median Std. Q1 Q3 
 
Pre-restatement period (n= 4,104) 
UR 0.001 0.001 0.079 -0.037 0.041 
UE 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.002 
NONLINEAR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MTB 2.764 2.072 2.788 1.339 3.300 
BETA 1.105 1.032 0.590 0.674 1.478 
SIZE 7.153 7.046 1.600 5.975 8.229 
LOSS 0.298 0.000 0.458 0.000 1.000 
Q4 0.222 0.000 0.416 0.000 0.000 
PREDICT 0.007 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.001 
PERSIST 0.137 0.079 0.445 -0.154 0.421 
AGE 19.171 11.000 19.012 6.000 29.000 
 
Post-restatement period (n= 8,755) 
UR 0.002 0.000 0.076 -0.038 0.039 
UE 0.002 0.000 0.023 -0.001 0.002 
NONLINEAR 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MTB 2.667 2.089 2.703 1.349 3.270 
BETA 1.176*** 1.129*** 0.530 0.812 1.496 
SIZE 7.343*** 7.222*** 1.629 6.211 8.520 
LOSS 0.277 0.000 0.448 0.000 1.000 
Q4 0.230 0.000 0.421 0.000 0.000 
PREDICT 0.010*** 0.000*** 0.038 0.000 0.001 
PERSIST 0.122 0.087 0.412 -0.154 0.383 
AGE 22.026*** 14.000*** 19.305 8.000 31.000 
*** significantly different between the pre- and post-restatement period at the 0.01 level (two-sided).
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TABLE 2 (cont’d) 
 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics on the regression variables: Material restatements in the full 
sample 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics on the variables used in the regression analyses for material 
restatements in the full sample, separately for the pre- and post-restatement period. The descriptive 
statistics are based on 3,413 firm-quarters with required data from 343 material restatements announced 
in the period 1997-2006. The pre-restatement period includes quarter -4 to quarter 0 and the post-
restatement period includes quarter 1 to quarter 12. See Panel B for variable definitions.  
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Q1 Q3 
 
Pre-restatement period (n= 1,163) 
UR 0.003 0.001 0.085 -0.041 0.043 
UE 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.002 
NONLINEAR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MTB 2.752 2.048 2.770 1.267 3.355 
BETA 1.223 1.136 0.638 0.739 1.647 
SIZE 7.524 7.413 1.634 6.257 8.770 
LOSS 0.383 0.000 0.486 0.000 1.000 
Q4 0.222 0.000 0.416 0.000 0.000 
PREDICT 0.008 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.001 
PERSIST 0.128 0.068 0.458 -0.186 0.437 
AGE 18.560 11.000 18.733 5.000 28.000 
 
Post-restatement period (n= 2,250) 
UR 0.009 0.003 0.077 -0.035 0.048 
UE 0.003 0.000 0.029 -0.001 0.003 
NONLINEAR 0.000*** 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
MTB 2.423*** 1.922*** 2.990 1.204 3.142 
BETA 1.215 1.136 0.544 0.845 1.538 
SIZE 7.552 7.434 1.651 6.375 8.800 
LOSS 0.348 0.000 0.476 0.000 1.000 
Q4 0.230 0.000 0.421 0.000 0.000 
PREDICT 0.019*** 0.000*** 0.054 0.000 0.003 
PERSIST 0.142 0.105 0.428 -0.135 0.409 
AGE 20.901*** 14.000*** 18.709 8.000 30.000 
 
*** significantly different between the pre- and post-restatement period at the 0.01 level (two-sided). 
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TABLE 3 
Change in the information content of earnings after restatement announcements 
 
This table reports regression results from the following model: 
 
		ܷܴ௜௧ 			ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ∑ ߙଶ,௧ܴܳܶ௧ ൅ ߚଵܷܧ௜௧ ൅ ∑ ߚଶ,௧ሾܷܧ௜௧ ൈ ܴܳܶ௧ሿ ൅ ߚଷܱܰܰܮܫܰܧܣܴ௜௧ଵଶ௧ୀଵଵଶ௧ୀଵ ൅
∑ ߚ௞ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ ௜ܵ௧ ൅ ∑ ߚ௞ሾܷܧ௜௧ ൈ ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ ௜ܵ௧ሿ ൅ ߝ௜௧ଵ଻௞ୀଵଵଵ଴௞ୀସ     (1) 
 
where ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ ௜ܵ௧ ൌ ሼܯܶܤ௜௧, ܤܧܶܣ௜௧, ܵܫܼܧ௜௧, ܮܱܵ ௜ܵ௧, ܳ4௜௧, ܴܲܧܦܫܥ ௜ܶ௧, ܲܧܴܵܫܵ ௜ܶ௧ሽ 
 
ܷܴ௜௧ is the cumulative abnormal returns in the three-day window around the earnings announcement date 
for firm i at quarter t, where the abnormal return is defined as the firm’s return less the CRSP value-
weighted market return. ܴܳܶ௧ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the earnings announcement pertains to 
quarter t and 0 otherwise. ܷܧ௜௧ is firm i’s unexpected quarterly earnings in quarter t, scaled by price at the 
end of the fiscal quarter, with expected earnings proxied by the median of analysts’ earnings forecasts 
issued within 60 days prior to quarter t’s earnings announcement date. Please see Panel B of Table 2 for 
the definition of control variables. The control variables are mean-adjusted so that the coefficient on UE 
can be interpreted as the earnings response coefficient (ERC) for a firm with average firm characteristics. 
 
The table reports the coefficient estimates, the corresponding p-values (one-sided for the coefficients in 
the box and two-sided otherwise), the number of observations, and adjusted R2. The p-values are based on 
standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering. The regression is based on 12,859 firm-quarters with 
required data from 1,208 restatements announced in the period 1997-2006. We tabulate the results after 
eliminating outliers, defined as observations with studentized residuals greater than 2.5 in absolute value. 
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TABLE 3 (cont’d) 
 
 All restatements 
(1) 
 Material restatements 
(2) 
 Other restatements 
(3) 
 Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value 
Intercept 0.000 0.866  -0.005 0.027  0.006 0.066 
UE 2.319 0.001  3.298 0.001  2.021 0.001 
UE×QTR1 -1.385 0.001  -2.133 0.002  -1.077 0.002 
UE×QTR2 -0.683 0.017  -2.321 0.001  0.016 0.513 
UE×QTR3 -1.017 0.004  -2.621 0.001  -0.470 0.117 
UE×QTR4 -0.379 0.199  -2.375 0.001  1.444 0.985 
UE×QTR5 0.080 0.573  -1.986 0.001  1.043 0.934 
UE×QTR6 -0.399 0.224  -1.900 0.004  0.201 0.614 
UE×QTR7 0.243 0.612  -1.008 0.044  0.651 0.811 
UE×QTR8 -0.639 0.112  -1.777 0.002  0.054 0.530 
UE×QTR9 -1.196 0.006  -1.673 0.005  -0.775 0.124 
UE×QTR10 0.025 0.618  -1.027 0.050  0.157 0.593 
UE×QTR11 0.456 0.815  -1.564 0.022  1.190 0.973 
UE×QTR12 0.240 0.664  -0.643 0.287  0.668 0.866 
NONLINEAR 7.960 0.007  3.420 0.285  11.321 0.004 
MTB -0.001 0.259  0.000 0.908  -0.001 0.292 
BETA -0.001 0.245  0.000 0.896  -0.002 0.065 
SIZE 0.000 0.660  -0.004 0.003  -0.001 0.490 
LOSS -0.007 0.001  -0.006 0.001  -0.008 0.001 
Q4 0.002 0.004  0.000 0.779  0.003 0.001 
PREDICT 0.002 0.102  0.001 0.673  0.000 0.778 
PERSIST 0.001 0.382  0.001 0.347  0.000 0.843 
UE× MTB -0.064 0.467  -0.012 0.932  -0.193 0.199 
UE× BETA 0.115 0.400  0.151 0.415  0.165 0.321 
UE× SIZE 0.662 0.001  0.454 0.021  0.812 0.001 
UE× LOSS -0.290 0.015  -0.478 0.001  -0.240 0.097 
UE× Q4 -0.272 0.014  0.027 0.829  -0.526 0.001 
UE× PREDICT -0.080 0.206  -0.035 0.678  -0.007 0.931 
UE× PERSIST 0.013 0.924  -0.084 0.689  -0.029 0.845 
         
Quarter-fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 12,859  3,413  9,446 
Adj. R2 0.073  0.111  0.076 
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TABLE 4  
Change in the information content of earnings after restatement announcements 
– using restatements from the Audit Analytics database 
 
This table reports regression results from the following model: 
 
		ܷܴ௜௧ 			ൌ ߙଵ ൅෍ߙଶ,௧ܴܳܶ௧ ൅ ߚଵܷܧ௜௧ ൅෍ߚଶ,௧ሾܷܧ௜௧ ൈ ܴܳܶ௧ሿ ൅ ߚଷܱܰܰܮܫܰܧܣܴ௜௧
ଵଶ
௧ୀଵ
ଵଶ
௧ୀଵ
 
൅∑ ߚ௞ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ ௜ܵ௧ ൅ ∑ ߚ௞ሾܷܧ௜௧ ൈ ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ ௜ܵ௧ሿ ൅ ߝ௜௧ଵ଻௞ୀଵଵଵ଴௞ୀସ     (1) 
 
where ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ ௜ܵ௧ ൌ ሼܯܶܤ௜௧, ܤܧܶܣ௜௧, ܵܫܼܧ௜௧, ܮܱܵ ௜ܵ௧, ܳ4௜௧, ܴܲܧܦܫܥ ௜ܶ௧, ܲܧܴܵܫܵ ௜ܶ௧ሽ 
 
ܷܴ௜௧ is the cumulative abnormal returns in the three-day window around the earnings announcement date 
for firm i at quarter t, where the abnormal return is defined as the firm’s return less the CRSP value-
weighted market return. ܴܳܶ௧ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the earnings announcement pertains to 
quarter t and 0 otherwise. ܷܧ௜௧ is firm i’s unexpected quarterly earnings in quarter t, scaled by price at the 
end of the fiscal quarter, with expected earnings proxied by the median of analysts’ earnings forecasts 
issued within 60 days prior to quarter t’s earnings announcement date. Please see Panel B of Table 2 for 
the definition of control variables. The control variables are mean-adjusted so that the coefficient on UE 
can be interpreted as the earnings response coefficient (ERC) for a firm with average firm characteristics. 
 
The table reports the coefficient estimates, the corresponding p-values (one-sided for the coefficients in 
the box and two-sided otherwise), the number of observations, and adjusted R2. The p-values are based on 
standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering. The regression is based on 21,261 firm-quarters with 
required data from 2,033 restatements announced in the period 2000-2008, as obtained from the Audit 
Analytics database. Of the 2,033 restatements, 211 restatements are classified as material restatements 
(i.e., those indicated as frauds in the Audit Analytics database or associated with AAERs), and the rest are 
classified as other restatements. We tabulate the results after eliminating outliers, defined as observations 
with studentized residuals greater than 2.5 in absolute value. 
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TABLE 4 (cont’d) 
 
 All restatements (1) 
 Material restatements 
(2) 
 Other restatements 
(3) 
 Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value 
Intercept 0.001 0.382  0.009 0.014  0.000 0.938 
UE 1.556 0.001  1.792 0.001  1.810 0.001 
UE×QTR1 -0.268 0.033  -1.156 0.006  -0.394 0.015 
UE×QTR2 -0.346 0.009  -0.741 0.001  -0.323 0.095 
UE×QTR3 -0.110 0.232  -1.331 0.029  -0.078 0.318 
UE×QTR4 -0.102 0.234  -0.848 0.034  -0.138 0.173 
UE×QTR5 -0.091 0.264  -0.406 0.062  -0.158 0.149 
UE×QTR6 -0.036 0.401  -0.830 0.009  0.059 0.636 
UE×QTR7 -0.174 0.075  -0.421 0.046  -0.073 0.289 
UE×QTR8 0.004 0.514  -0.349 0.052  0.046 0.621 
UE×QTR9 0.119 0.746  -0.557 0.032  0.103 0.722 
UE×QTR10 0.082 0.701  -0.402 0.097  0.044 0.599 
UE×QTR11 0.072 0.702  -0.917 0.187  0.026 0.573 
UE×QTR12 0.063 0.695  -0.090 0.389  0.034 0.599 
NONLINEAR -6.524 0.006  3.061 0.376  -12.529 0.001 
MTB -0.001 0.257  0.001 0.550  -0.001 0.176 
BETA 0.000 0.884  0.003 0.230  0.000 0.520 
SIZE -0.003 0.001  -0.004 0.053  -0.003 0.001 
LOSS -0.009 0.001  -0.007 0.001  -0.009 0.001 
Q4 0.000 0.515  0.001 0.536  0.000 0.697 
PREDICT 0.003 0.002  0.000 0.899  0.003 0.001 
PERSIST 0.001 0.242  0.005 0.008  0.000 0.719 
UE× MTB 0.006 0.853  0.112 0.050  0.068 0.159 
UE× BETA 0.058 0.173  -0.019 0.825  0.081 0.074 
UE× SIZE -0.019 0.712  0.163 0.095  -0.011 0.855 
UE× LOSS -0.573 0.001  -0.820 0.001  -0.518 0.001 
UE× Q4 -0.194 0.001  -0.124 0.185  -0.200 0.001 
UE× PREDICT -0.006 0.679  0.080 0.049  -0.013 0.386 
UE× PERSIST -0.019 0.658  -0.042 0.269  0.010 0.808 
         
Quarter-fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 21,261  2,034  19,227 
Adj. R2 0.066  0.075  0.071 
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TABLE 5 
Change in the information content of earnings after restatement announcements 
- the impact of financial reporting credibility 
 
This table reports regression results from the following model: 
 
		ܷܴ௜௧ 			ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ∑ ߙଶ,௧ܴܳܶ௧ ൅ ߚଵܷܧ௜௧ ൅ ∑ ߚଶ,௧ሾܷܧ௜௧ ൈ ܴܳܶ௧ሿ ൅ ߚଷܱܰܰܮܫܰܧܣܴ௜௧ଵଶ௧ୀଵଵଶ௧ୀଵ ൅
∑ ߚ௞ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ ௜ܵ௧ ൅ ∑ ߚ௞ሾܷܧ௜௧ ൈ ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ ௜ܵ௧ሿ ൅ ߝ௜௧ଵ଻௞ୀଵଵଵ଴௞ୀସ     (1) 
 
where ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ ௜ܵ௧ ൌ ሼܯܶܤ௜௧, ܤܧܶܣ௜௧, ܵܫܼܧ௜௧, ܮܱܵ ௜ܵ௧, ܳ4௜௧, ܴܲܧܦܫܥ ௜ܶ௧, ܲܧܴܵܫܵ ௜ܶ௧ሽ 
 
ܷܴ௜௧ is the cumulative abnormal returns in the three-day window around the earnings announcement date 
for firm i at quarter t, where the abnormal return is defined as the firm’s return less the CRSP value-
weighted market return. ܴܳܶ௧ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the earnings announcement pertains to 
quarter t and 0 otherwise. ܷܧ௜௧ is firm i’s unexpected quarterly earnings in quarter t, scaled by price at the 
end of the fiscal quarter, with expected earnings proxied by the median of analysts’ earnings forecasts 
issued within 60 days prior to quarter t’s earnings announcement date. Please see Panel B of Table 2 for 
the definition of control variables. The control variables are mean-adjusted so that the coefficient on UE 
can be interpreted as the earnings response coefficient (ERC) for a firm with average firm characteristics. 
 
The table reports the coefficient estimates, the corresponding p-values (one-sided for the coefficients in 
the box and two-sided otherwise), the number of observations, and adjusted R2. The p-values are based on 
standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering. We tabulate the results after eliminating outliers, 
defined as observations with studentized residuals greater than 2.5 in absolute value. 
 
In Panel A, the regressions are estimated separately for the good news group – firm-quarters with positive 
unexpected earnings– and for the bad news group – firm-quarters with negative unexpected earnings. The 
regressions are based on 3,413 firm-quarters with required data from 343 material restatements 
announced in the period 1997-2006. In Panel B, the regressions are estimated separately for the high 
accrual group and the low accrual group. The high (low) accrual group includes firm-quarters with total 
accruals higher (lower) than industry means based on all non-restating firms in Compustat in that quarter, 
with industries defined based on the Fama and French classification. Total accruals are calculated as 
income before extraordinary items minus the sum of operating cash flows and investing cash flows, 
scaled by total assets. The regressions are based on 3,374 firm-quarters with required data from 343 
material restatements announced in the period 1997-2006.   
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TABLE 5 (cont’d) 
 
Panel A: Good news versus bad news 
 
  Good news group 
(1) 
 Bad news group 
(2) 
  Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value 
Intercept  0.018 0.001  -0.004 0.314 
UE  2.310 0.005  2.063 0.074 
UE×QTR1  -2.103 0.001  -1.870 0.161 
UE×QTR2  -2.579 0.010  -2.959 0.042 
UE×QTR3  -2.551 0.001  1.331 0.786 
UE×QTR4  -2.430 0.001  -0.083 0.480 
UE×QTR5  -2.301 0.002  0.673 0.650 
UE×QTR6  -1.073 0.057  -2.064 0.073 
UE×QTR7  -2.164 0.001  1.095 0.727 
UE×QTR8  -1.663 0.016  -1.999 0.173 
UE×QTR9  -1.400 0.043  -2.494 0.060 
UE×QTR10  -2.343 0.001  0.671 0.624 
UE×QTR11  -1.163 0.085  0.167 0.532 
UE×QTR12  0.950 0.790  -0.071 0.487 
NONLINEAR  9.950 0.790  -1.159 0.736 
MTB  0.003 0.312  -0.004 0.158 
BETA  0.000 0.894  -0.003 0.345 
SIZE  -0.006 0.015  -0.005 0.132 
LOSS  -0.006 0.030  -0.001 0.823 
Q4  -0.001 0.723  0.003 0.170 
PREDICT  0.001 0.716  -0.003 0.501 
PERSIST  0.003 0.232  -0.002 0.484 
UE× MTB  -0.095 0.550  -0.368 0.333 
UE× BETA  0.117 0.594  0.163 0.744 
UE× SIZE  0.333 0.119  -0.120 0.806 
UE× LOSS  -0.451 0.001  -0.287 0.560 
UE× Q4  0.061 0.762  0.424 0.255 
UE× PREDICT  0.037 0.719  -0.358 0.394 
UE× PERSIST  -0.128 0.524  -0.280 0.596 
       
Quarter-fixed effects   Yes  Yes 
N  1,909  1,504 
Adj. R2  0.093  0.045 
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TABLE 5 (cont’d) 
 
Panel B: High accruals versus low accruals 
 
  High accrual group 
(1) 
 Low accrual group 
(2) 
  Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value 
Intercept  0.005 0.470  0.009 0.004 
UE  4.032 0.001  3.016 0.001 
UE×QTR1  -3.049 0.002  -0.546 0.273 
UE×QTR2  -2.970 0.001  -1.634 0.021 
UE×QTR3  -3.793 0.042  -2.091 0.004 
UE×QTR4  -4.099 0.001  -1.202 0.059 
UE×QTR5  -4.752 0.001  -0.918 0.144 
UE×QTR6  -3.918 0.019  -0.982 0.165 
UE×QTR7  -3.832 0.001  -0.183 0.394 
UE×QTR8  -2.485 0.052  -0.988 0.114 
UE×QTR9  -2.691 0.080  -0.890 0.137 
UE×QTR10  -3.450 0.008  -0.414 0.302 
UE×QTR11  -3.354 0.055  -0.693 0.258 
UE×QTR12  0.490 0.651  1.043 0.758 
NONLINEAR  -12.056 0.230  2.554 0.432 
MTB  0.002 0.358  -0.001 0.761 
BETA  -0.002 0.571  0.000 0.953 
SIZE  -0.007 0.019  -0.003 0.117 
LOSS  -0.012 0.162  -0.005 0.013 
Q4  -0.002 0.394  0.001 0.402 
PREDICT  0.001 0.892  0.001 0.575 
PERSIST  0.003 0.173  0.000 0.840 
UE× MTB  -0.166 0.621  -0.002 0.991 
UE× BETA  0.762 0.174  0.177 0.378 
UE× SIZE  0.836 0.023  0.430 0.137 
UE× LOSS  -1.555 0.002  -0.226 0.238 
UE× Q4  0.257 0.520  0.104 0.585 
UE× PREDICT  0.221 0.410  -0.148 0.065 
UE× PERSIST  0.125 0.664  -0.177 0.399 
       
Quarter-fixed effects   Yes  Yes 
N  1,280  2,094 
Adj. R2  0.146  0.121 
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TABLE 6 
Remedy actions undertaken by the firm and the change in the information content of 
earnings after restatement announcements 
 
This table presents summary of regression results from the following regression: 
 ܷܴ௜௧ ൌ 	ߙଵ ൅ ∑ ߙଶ,௧ܴܳܶ௜௧ ൅ ߚଵܷܧ௜௧ ൅ ∑ ߚଶ,௧ሾܷܧ௜௧ ൈ ܴܳܶ௜௧ሿଵଶ௧ୀଵଵଶ௧ୀଵ  
 ൅ߙଷܥ݄ܽ݊݃݁௜ ൅ ∑ ߙସ,௧ܴܳܶ௜௧ଵଶ௧ୀଵ ൈ ܥ݄ܽ݊݃݁௜ 
 ൅ߚଷܷܧ௜௧ ൈ ܥ݄ܽ݊݃݁௜ ൅ ∑ ߚସ,௧ሾܷܧ௜௧ ൈ ܴܳܶ௜௧ ൈ ܥ݄ܽ݊݃݁௜ሿଵଶ௧ୀଵ  
 ൅ߚହܱܰܰܮܫܰܧܣܴ௜௧ ൅	∑ ߚ௞ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ ௜ܵ௧ ൅ ∑ ߚ௞ሾܷܧ௜௧ ൈ ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ ௜ܵ௧ሿ ൅ ߝ௜௧ଵଽ௞ୀଵଷଵଶ௞ୀ଺   (2) 
where ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ ௜ܵ௧ ൌ ሼܯܶܤ௜௧, ܤܧܶܣ௜௧, ܵܫܼܧ௜௧, ܮܱܵ ௜ܵ௧, ܳ4௜௧, ܴܲܧܦܫܥ ௜ܶ௧, ܲܧܴܵܫܵ ௜ܶ௧ሽ 
 
ܷܴ௜௧ is the cumulative abnormal returns in the three-day window around the earnings announcement date 
for firm i at quarter t, where the abnormal return is defined as the firm’s return less the CRSP value-
weighted market return. ܴܳܶ௧ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the earnings announcement pertains to 
quarter t and 0 otherwise. ܷܧ௜௧ is firm i’s unexpected quarterly earnings in quarter t, scaled by price at the 
end of the fiscal quarter, with expected earnings proxied by the median of analysts’ earnings forecasts 
issued within 60 days prior to quarter t’s earnings announcement date. Please see individual panels for the 
definition of Changei and Panel B of Table 2 for the definition of other variables. The control variables 
are mean-adjusted so that the coefficient on UE can be interpreted as the earnings response coefficient 
(ERC) for a firm with average firm characteristics. 
 
The table presents the difference in the ERC between the post-restatement period and the pre-restatement 
period, separately for material restatement firms with Changei equal to one and those with Changei equal 
to zero, and the corresponding one-sided p-values. The p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for 
firm-level clustering. The regression is based on the material restatements in the full sample – 3,413 firm-
quarters with required data from 343 material restatements announced in the period 1997-2006. We 
eliminate outliers, defined as observations with studentized residuals greater than 2.5 in absolute value.  
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TABLE 6 (cont’d) 
 
Panel A: Increase in accounting conservatism and the drop in the ERC 
 
In this panel, Changei is one for restatement firms with an increase in C-Score, as developed in Khan and 
Watts (2009), from the year before to the year after the restatement announcement, and zero otherwise. 
38.8% of the material restatement firms experience an increase in C-Score over this period.  
 
 
Material restatement firms without 
an increase in C-Score  
Material restatement firms with  
an increase in C-Score 
   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Pre-restatement 
period ERC β1 3.214 0.001  β1 + β3 3.630 0.001 
Difference in the ERC between quarter t in the post-restatement period and the pre-restatement period 
Quarter   1 β2,t=1 -1.944 0.035  β2,t=1 + β4,t=1 -2.671 0.004 
2 β2,t=2 -1.762 0.002  β2,t=2 + β4,t=2 -2.380 0.002 
3 β2,t=3 -2.767 0.001  β2,t=3 + β4,t=3 -2.903 0.017 
4 β2,t=4 -2.402 0.001  β2,t=4 + β4,t=4 -2.192 0.002 
5 β2,t=5 -1.597 0.008  β2,t=5 + β4,t=5 -2.248 0.011 
6 β2,t=6 -1.560 0.065  β2,t=6 + β4,t=6 -2.727 0.050 
7 β2,t=7 -0.996 0.063  β2,t=7 + β4,t=7 -0.240 0.375 
8 β2,t=8 -1.602 0.017  β2,t=8 + β4,t=8 -1.279 0.110 
9 β2,t=9 -1.503 0.006  β2,t=9 + β4,t=9 -0.429 0.362 
10 β2,t=10 -1.346 0.035  β2,t=10 + β4,t=10 -0.846 0.155 
11 β2,t=11 -1.414 0.034  β2,t=11 + β4,t=11 0.408 0.420 
12 β2,t=12 0.141 0.526  β2,t=12 + β4,t=12 -1.176 0.139 
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TABLE 6 (cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Executive turnover and the drop in the ERC 
 
In this panel, Changei is one for restatement firms with turnover of both CEO and CFO in the year of 
restatement announcement, and zero otherwise. 26.6% of the material restatement firms experience both 
CEO and CFO turnover in the year of restatement announcement.  
 
 
Material restatement firms without 
CEO/CFO turnover  
Material restatement firms with 
CEO/CFO turnover 
   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Pre-restatement 
period ERC β1 3.470 0.001  β1 + β3 3.148 0.001 
Difference in the ERC between quarter t in the post-restatement period and the pre-restatement period 
Quarter   1 β2,t=1 -2.233 0.004  β2,t=1 + β4,t=1 -1.591 0.165 
2 β2,t=2 -2.371 0.001  β2,t=2 + β4,t=2 -2.188 0.001 
3 β2,t=3 -1.477 0.042  β2,t=3 + β4,t=3 -3.372 0.001 
4 β2,t=4 -2.776 0.001  β2,t=4 + β4,t=4 -1.273 0.074 
5 β2,t=5 -2.184 0.001  β2,t=5 + β4,t=5 -0.907 0.102 
6 β2,t=6 -2.459 0.001  β2,t=6 + β4,t=6 0.116 0.500 
7 β2,t=7 -1.702 0.029  β2,t=7 + β4,t=7 -0.219 0.397 
8 β2,t=8 -1.911 0.003  β2,t=8 + β4,t=8 -0.686 0.297 
9 β2,t=9 -2.171 0.003  β2,t=9 + β4,t=9 -0.746 0.220 
10 β2,t=10 -1.030 0.085  β2,t=10 + β4,t=10 0.235 0.547 
11 β2,t=11 -1.628 0.026  β2,t=11 + β4,t=11 0.770 0.634 
12 β2,t=12 -0.629 0.255  β2,t=12 + β4,t=12 0.018 0.504 
  
51 
 
TABLE 6 (cont’d) 
 
Panel C: Auditor dismissal and the drop in the ERC 
 
In this panel, Changei is one for restatement firms with auditor dismissals in the year of restatement 
announcement, and zero otherwise. 14.5% of the material restatement firms experience auditor dismissal 
in the year of restatement announcement. Note that Changei is zero for restatement firms with auditor 
resignations.  
 
 
Material restatement firms 
without auditor dismissal  
Material restatement firms  
with auditor dismissal 
   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Pre-restatement 
period ERC β1 3.331 0.001  β1 + β3 3.091 0.001 
Difference in the ERC between quarter t in the post-restatement period and the pre-restatement period 
Quarter  1 β2,t=1 -2.208 0.003  β2,t=1 + β4,t=1 -2.235 0.090 
2 β2,t=2 -2.227 0.001  β2,t=2 + β4,t=2 -2.254 0.001 
3 β2,t=3 -2.724 0.001  β2,t=3 + β4,t=3 -1.619 0.214 
4 β2,t=4 -2.388 0.001  β2,t=4 + β4,t=4 -2.308 0.001 
5 β2,t=5 -1.933 0.002  β2,t=5 + β4,t=5 -2.360 0.055 
6 β2,t=6 -2.313 0.002  β2,t=6 + β4,t=6 -0.755 0.138 
7 β2,t=7 -1.161 0.057  β2,t=7 + β4,t=7 -0.657 0.120 
8 β2,t=8 -1.900 0.004  β2,t=8 + β4,t=8 -1.234 0.180 
9 β2,t=9 -1.783 0.008  β2,t=9 + β4,t=9 -0.003 0.501 
10 β2,t=10 -1.269 0.060  β2,t=10 + β4,t=10 1.001 0.799 
11 β2,t=11 -1.769 0.016  β2,t=11 + β4,t=11 0.322 0.592 
12 β2,t=12 -0.795 0.211  β2,t=12 + β4,t=12 0.848 0.332 
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TABLE 6 (cont’d) 
 
Panel D: Audit committee chair turnover and the drop in the ERC 
 
In this panel, Changei is one for restatement firms with turnover of the audit committee chair in the year 
of restatement announcement, and zero otherwise. 30.3% of the material restatement firms experience 
audit committee chair turnover in the year of restatement announcement.  
 
 
Material restatement firms without 
audit committee chair turnover  
Material restatement firms with 
audit committee chair turnover 
   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Pre-restatement 
period ERC β1 3.326 0.001  β1 + β3 3.369 0.001 
Difference in the ERC between quarter t in the post-restatement period and the pre-restatement period 
Quarter   1 β2,t=1 -2.264 0.003  β2,t=1 + β4,t=1 -2.378 0.089 
2 β2,t=2 -2.026 0.001  β2,t=2 + β4,t=2 -1.778 0.048 
3 β2,t=3 -2.657 0.001  β2,t=3 + β4,t=3 -2.283 0.072 
4 β2,t=4 -2.439 0.001  β2,t=4 + β4,t=4 -1.710 0.055 
5 β2,t=5 -1.744 0.003  β2,t=5 + β4,t=5 0.446 0.597 
6 β2,t=6 -2.279 0.047  β2,t=6 + β4,t=6 -1.271 0.137 
7 β2,t=7 -0.715 0.092  β2,t=7 + β4,t=7 -1.667 0.153 
8 β2,t=8 -1.510 0.026  β2,t=8 + β4,t=8 -0.895 0.202 
9 β2,t=9 -1.169 0.085  β2,t=9 + β4,t=9 -1.309 0.124 
10 β2,t=10 -0.923 0.086  β2,t=10 + β4,t=10 0.857 0.739 
11 β2,t=11 -1.192 0.062  β2,t=11 + β4,t=11 1.664 0.735 
12 β2,t=12 -1.411 0.051  β2,t=12 + β4,t=12 2.549 0.937 
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TABLE 7 
Change in the information content of earnings after restatement announcements 
- Analysis of the restricted sample (reconciliation with Wilson 2008) 
 
This table reports regression results from the following model: 
 
		ܷܴ௜௧ 			ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ∑ ߙଶ,௧ܴܳܶ௧ ൅ ߚଵܷܧ௜௧ ൅ ∑ ߚଶ,௧ሾܷܧ௜௧ ൈ ܴܳܶ௧ሿ ൅ ߚଷܱܰܰܮܫܰܧܣܴ௜௧ଵଶ௧ୀଵଵଶ௧ୀଵ ൅
∑ ߚ௞ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ ௜ܵ௧ ൅ ∑ ߚ௞ሾܷܧ௜௧ ൈ ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ ௜ܵ௧ሿ ൅ ߝ௜௧ଵ଻௞ୀଵଵଵ଴௞ୀସ     (1) 
 
where ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ ௜ܵ௧ ൌ ሼܯܶܤ௜௧, ܤܧܶܣ௜௧, ܵܫܼܧ௜௧, ܮܱܵ ௜ܵ௧, ܳ4௜௧, ܴܲܧܦܫܥ ௜ܶ௧, ܲܧܴܵܫܵ ௜ܶ௧ሽ 
 
ܷܴ௜௧ is the cumulative abnormal returns in the three-day window around the earnings announcement date 
for firm i at quarter t, where the abnormal return is defined as the firm’s return less the CRSP value-
weighted market return. ܴܳܶ௧ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the earnings announcement pertains to 
quarter t and 0 otherwise. ܷܧ௜௧ is firm i’s unexpected quarterly earnings in quarter t, scaled by price at the 
end of the fiscal quarter, with expected earnings proxied by the median of analysts’ earnings forecasts 
issued within 60 days prior to quarter t’s earnings announcement date. Please see Panel B of Table 2 for 
the definition of control variables. The control variables are mean-adjusted so that the coefficient on UE 
can be interpreted as the earnings response coefficient (ERC) for a firm with average firm characteristics. 
 
The table reports the coefficient estimates, the corresponding p-values (one-sided for the coefficients in 
the box and two-sided otherwise), the number of observations, and adjusted R2. The p-values are based on 
standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering. The regression is based on the restricted sample – 8,157 
firm-quarters with required data from 641 restatements announced in the period 1997-2006. All 
restatement firms are required to have sufficient data for the two quarters immediately around the 
restatement announcement. We tabulate the results after eliminating outliers, defined as observations with 
studentized residuals greater than 2.5 in absolute value. 
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TABLE 7 (cont’d) 
 
 All restatements 
(1) 
 Material restatements 
(2) 
 Other restatements 
(3) 
 Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value 
Intercept -0.002 0.374  0.006 0.066  -0.005 0.027 
UE 3.456 0.001  3.610 0.001  3.444 0.001 
UE×QTR1 -1.516 0.001  -2.676 0.001  -0.913 0.090 
UE×QTR2 -1.572 0.001  -2.502 0.001  -1.530 0.057 
UE×QTR3 -2.112 0.001  -2.660 0.001  -1.568 0.051 
UE×QTR4 -1.429 0.009  -2.770 0.001  0.680 0.795 
UE×QTR5 -0.351 0.267  -2.374 0.001  0.728 0.786 
UE×QTR6 -0.588 0.194  -1.805 0.019  0.230 0.593 
UE×QTR7 -0.012 0.493  -0.993 0.087  0.826 0.770 
UE×QTR8 -0.701 0.149  -1.271 0.053  -0.564 0.257 
UE×QTR9 -0.668 0.160  -1.167 0.109  -0.417 0.345 
UE×QTR10 -0.856 0.128  -1.197 0.107  -0.266 0.396 
UE×QTR11 0.003 0.502  -1.375 0.106  1.070 0.932 
UE×QTR12 -0.607 0.196  -1.130 0.122  0.339 0.661 
NONLINEAR 3.132 0.340  2.478 0.487  6.658 0.200 
MTB -0.002 0.114  -0.001 0.719  -0.001 0.181 
BETA -0.001 0.233  0.000 0.911  -0.002 0.104 
SIZE 0.000 0.631  -0.001 0.424  -0.001 0.516 
LOSS -0.006 0.001  -0.003 0.093  -0.008 0.001 
Q4 0.002 0.028  -0.002 0.315  0.003 0.003 
PREDICT 0.001 0.618  0.000 0.992  -0.001 0.589 
PERSIST 0.001 0.196  0.001 0.555  0.001 0.368 
UE× MTB 0.100 0.462  -0.092 0.425  0.445 0.121 
UE× BETA -0.037 0.828  0.451 0.054  -0.292 0.184 
UE× SIZE 0.458 0.035  0.370 0.098  0.615 0.026 
UE× LOSS -0.365 0.009  -0.384 0.013  -0.448 0.029 
UE× Q4 -0.361 0.007  0.136 0.266  -0.675 0.001 
UE× PREDICT -0.142 0.101  -0.175 0.128  -0.073 0.539 
UE× PERSIST -0.212 0.242  -0.250 0.186  -0.100 0.639 
         
Quarter-fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 8,157  2,016  6,141 
Adj. R2 0.084  0.122  0.090 
 
 
